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In 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) became 
law. 1 The Act established environmental quality as a national prior-
ity, and involved all federal agencies in the process of making the 
environment an essential consideration of national policy. 2 
The framers of NEP A intended that the Act prevent future actions 
which might endanger public health or cause irreparable damage to 
the air, land and water resources of the nation.3 Congress desired 
* Director of Clinical Placement, 1986-1987, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
LAW REVIEW. The author acknowledges the effort of Gayle Smalley, from whose idea this 
article grew. 
1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982). 
2 The policy goals of NEPA are set out in § 101(a): 
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all practicable means 
and measures ... to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature 
can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other require-
ments of past and future generations of Americans. 
Section 101(b) lists six major environmental objectives: 
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for 
succeeding generations; 
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and cultur-
ally pleasing surroundings; 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, 
risk to health or safety, or other undesirable or unintended consequences; 
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, 
and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and va-
riety of individual choice; 
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high 
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable 
recycling of depletable resources. 
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982). 
3 115 CONGo REC. S.40,416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Henry Jackson). For a detailed 
discussion of the legislative history of NEPA, see E. Hanks & J. Hanks, An Environmental 
481 
482 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:481 
that federal agencies would plan and control use of the environment 
rather than make arbitrary decisions. 4 NEPA was to be the means 
of ensuring such planning. 5 
Section 102(2)(C)6 of NEPA fulfilled this role. Dubbed as the "ac-
tion-forcing"7 provision of NEPA, it ensured that all federal agencies 
would consider the cost to the environment of their actions by setting 
out several duties that each agency must perform.8 Section 102(2)(C)9 
directed all federal agencies to prepare a detailed report which would 
indicate the environmental impact of an action, alternatives to that 
action, and identify any irreversible commitment of resources to the 
project. This report is the environmental impact statement (EIS). 
Section 102(2)(C) thus mandated that all federal agencies consider 
the environmental consequences of their actions before acting. lO Un-
der the statute, each agency was to administer this provision "to the 
fullest extent possible."l1 The Conference Committee report accom-
panying NEP A indicates that only a direct conflict between the 
requirements of NEPA and the agency's statutory mandate would 
excuse compliance with NEPA.12 Section 102(2)(C), which grew into 
Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 
RUTGERS L REV. 230 (1970); R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: 
NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH, Ch. 2 (1976). 
4 STAFFS OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, AND HOUSE COM-
MITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, CONGRESSIONIAL WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL 
POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (Comm. Print. 1968). 
5 See supra note 3. 
642 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). 
7 See 115 CONGo REC. S. 40,416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Henry Jackson). 
842 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982) directed all federal agencies to: 
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, 
a detailed statement by the responsible official on: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal 
be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
942 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(1982). 
10 See e.g., 115 CONGo REC. § 7815 (daily ed. July 10, 1969). 
11 See § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). 
12 The Congressional Conference Report accompanying NEP A directed that: 
each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out ... 
unless the existing law applicable to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or 
makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible. If such is found to be 
the case, then compliance with the particular directive is not immediately required 
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the requirement that a federal agency prepare an EIS before taking 
any major action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment,13 has been strictly construed by the courts. 14 
Agencies complied inconsistently with NEP A's requirements in 
the early 1970s,15 and in 1977 President Carter issued Executive 
Order 11,99p6 directing the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ), NEPA's advisory body, to publish new regulations. 17 These 
regulations would be binding upon all federal agencies, unless there 
was a clear conflict of statutory authority.18 In 1978, CEQ issued 
such regulations, which forced compliance with the procedural as-
pects of NEP A and encouraged uniformity in preparation of the 
EIS.19 The new binding regulations were to help effectuate the 
purpose of NEP A-to force agencies to take environmental values 
into account during the decision-making process.20 Included within 
these regulations was § 1506.11, an exception for emergency situa-
tions, which freed federal agencies from following the new regula-
tions if CEQ determined that an emergency existed.21 
.... Thus, it is the intent of the conferees that the provision "to the fullest extent 
possible" shall not be used by any Federal agency as a means of avoiding compliance 
with the directives set out in section 102. Rather, the language in section 102 is 
intended to assure that all agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with 
the directives set out in said section "to the fullest extent possible" under their 
statutory authorizations and that no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow 
construction of its existing authorizations to avoid compliance (emphasis supplied). 
H.R. Rep. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE. CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 2776. See also, Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness 
of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 648-9 (1970). See Envtl. Defense Fund V. 
TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1173-76 (6th Cir. 1972). 
13 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). This action has been defined to include "almost every 
form of significant federal activity." Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns V. United States Postal 
Service, 516 F.2d 378, 382 (2d Cir. 1975); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee V. United 
States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
14 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1115; Silva V. Lynn II, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1st 
Cir. 1973). For a discussion of various methods of reviewing agency decisions to prepare an 
EIS and the adequacy of the EIS once prepared, see D. MANDELKER, NEPA IN THE COURTS, 
Chs. 8 & 10 (1984). 
15 One commentator noted such inconsistencies as "inconsistent terminology" and "differ-
ences on public participation and use in the decision-making process." Liebesman, The Council 
on Environmental Quality's Regulations to Implement the National Environmental Policy 
Act-Will They Further NEPA's Substantive Mandate?, 10 E.L.R. 50039, 50045 (1980). 
16 Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978). 
17 Id. 
18 Id., § 2. 
19 See Council on Environmental Quality Final Regulations Implementing the Procedural 
Provisions of NEPA, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1986)) (here-
inafter CEQ Regulations). 
20 See supra note 8. 
21 See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (1986) which reads as follows: 
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This provision makes possible agency action without agency com-
pliance with CEQ's binding regulations. Once CEQ has determined 
that an emergency exists, it mandates consultation between the 
agency preparing the EIS and CEQ to prepare alternative arrange-
ments as soon as possible.22 CEQ has not defined what situations 
would constitute an emergency, nor has it specified whether 
§ 1506.11 waives the statutory requirements for preparation of an 
EIS. 
While the emergency provision allows noncompliance with CEQ's 
own regulations, it is capable of a more expansive interpretation. 
The main case which has reviewed the emergency provision, Crosby 
v. Young,23 has read the provision to allow CEQ to modify NEPA's 
requirement that a federal agency prepare and release an EIS before 
it takes any major action significantly affecting the evironment.24 By 
extending the court's reasoning in Crosby, CEQ may also be able, 
in a situation it defines as an emergency, to nullify the entire EIS 
requirement. 
This emergency exception represents a danger to the EIS process. 
NEPA commands federal agencies to prepare an EIS,25 and does 
not provide any exception for emergencies. Section 1506.11, a purely 
regulatory provision, thus modifies the statute. Today, once an 
"omergency" exists, the clear command of NEPA becomes blurred, 
and then a federal agency may cut short the EIS process or take a 
major action before completing the EIS process. Such an interpre-
tation represents a novel precedent that blunts the EIS procedure 
required by NEPA and could severely harm consideration of envi-
ronmental factors in agency decision making. 
This Comment discusses the appropriateness and legality of 
§ 1506.11. The Comment then uses the Crosby case to illustrate the 
harm that such an emergency exception can cause to consideration 
of the environmental factors mandated by NEPA. In Crosby, a great 
expenditure of resources occurred before the release of the EIS and 
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with significant 
environmental impact without observing the provisions of these regulations, the 
Federal agency taking the action should consult with the Council about alternative 
arrangements. Agencies and the Council will limit such arrangements to actions 
necessary to control the immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions remain 
subject to NEPA review. 
'l2 [d. 
23 512 F.Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
24 See id. at 1387. 
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). 
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therefore detailed consideration of environmental factors in the EIS 
occurred too late to affect some of the basic actions already taken. 26 
The Comment next considers how both Congress and the courts 
have emphasized strict adherence to the EIS requirement, and note 
how rarely there have been emergency exceptions and in what sit-
uations. Thus, a CEQ emergency provision as currently interpreted 
would seem to encroach upon power that Congress has reserved to 
itself and the courts have respected. 
Third, the Comment examines the legal deficiencies of § 1506.11. 
This provision may be ultra vires with respect to executive order 
11,991. While this order authorized regulations to enforce procedural 
compliance with NEPA, it did not authorize substantive alterations 
of NEPA. In addition, if the statutory mandate simply does not 
grant CEQ any power to substantively change the EIS requirement, 
a reviewing court should not grant CEQ's emergency decisions any 
deference, since such a provision, as drafted, is not a reasonable 
interpretation of CEQ's statutory mandate. 
The Comment shall then discuss how § 1506.11 may hamper ju-
dicial review of an agency's consideration of environmental factors 
mandated by NEPA. Since courts should only review an EIS to 
ensure adequate procedural compliance with NEPA,27 a provision 
that waives or delays the EIS requirement deprives the court of a 
critical tool with which to measure compliance. In addition, by allow-
ing a premature commitment of resources to a project, § 1506.11 
may deprive a court of any opportunity to provide for remedial 
measures should an agency inadequately consider NEPA's goals. 
Finally, the Comment offers some suggestions for an improved 
emergency procedure. Should Congress desire to provide in advance 
for emergency exceptions to NEP A requirements, it could create a 
procedure that would ensure proper deference to NEPA's goals and 
build an adequate record for review. Thus, Congress can protect the 
NEP A process while still allowing for a rapid response to an emer-
gency situation. 
II. CROSBY V. YOUNG: FRUSTRATING THE NEPA PROCESS 
In the spring of 1980, the General Motors Corporation (GM) in-
formed the City of Detroit that it would phase out two of its auto-
26 See infra notes 28 to 68 and accompanying text. 
27 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see also Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 98 (1983). 
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motive plants in Detroit,28 an action that would result in a loss of 
approximately 6,150 jobs.29 Detroit was then mired in a severe eco-
nomic depression, brought on in large measure by the slump in the 
automotive industry.30 The Chrysler Corporation had recently closed 
its own automotive plant, costing the city 3,000 jobs.31 
To replace its aging and now obsolete automotive plants, GM 
planned to build a new facility. Despite offers to locate the new plant 
in several states other than Michigan,32 the company approached 
Mayor Coleman Young of Detroit with an offer to build the plant 
within the city33 if a suitable site could be found. 34 The plant would 
require an approximately 500 acre site with a rectangular shape and 
access to both a long haul railroad and a freeway system. 35 
Detroit began looking at nine possible sites for the plant.36 By 
midsummer the city began favoring the site of the abandoned Dodge 
Main automobile plant, which the Chrysler Corporation had shut 
down in January, and the surrounding neighborhood. 37 The area, 
called the Central Industrial Park (CIP), encompassed 1,176 build-
ings, 1,362 households and 3,438 people. 38 In July 1980 the city began 
purchasing property in the CIP area (which included part of a neigh-
28 Testimony of Emmett S. Moten, Jr., Appellee's Appendix at app. 2,3, Poletown Neigh-
borhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N. W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). Both Detroit and· the 
neighboring city of Hamtramck were involved in planning for the new GM facility. For 
simplicity, the text shall refer only to Detroit. 
29 See Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), Central Industrial Park, October 15, 
1980, II-5. 
30 See Bukowczyk, The Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood: Poletown vs. GM and 
the City of Detroit, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV., 49, 60-61 (1984). Detroit's unemployment rate 
stood at 18.3%, compared to the national average of 7.8%; unemployment among blacks was 
in excess of 25% and among black youths a staggering 55-60%. See Appellee's Appendix, 
supra note 28 at app. 8. See also Testimony of Mayor Coleman A. Young, Appellee's Appendix, 
supra note 28 at app. 81. 
31 See Bukowczyk, supra note 30 at 60. 
32 See Testimony of Mayor Coleman A. Young, Appellee's Appendix, supra note 30 at app. 
83. 
33 Testimony of Mayor Coleman A. Young, Appellee's Appendix, supra note 30 at app. 83. 
34 GM had a definite plan for the configuration of the site. It had recently built plants at 
Lake Orion and Oklahoma City (so-called "Green Fields" structures-large one story com-
plexes) which were identical in size and shape to the plant GM wanted to build in Detroit. 
See Letter from Thomas A. Murphy, Chairman of GM, to Mayor Coleman A. Young and 
Howard Woods, Chairman of the Economic Development Corporation of the City of Ham-
tramck (October 8, 1980) (summarizing GM's conditions discussed during the summer). See 
also Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,468 (Mich. 1981). 
35 See L. Bachelor, Urban Industrial Renewal in Detroit: A New Partnership or an Old 
Conspiracy, p. 6 (1981) (unpublished manuscript). 
36 See DE IS, supra note 29 at § 2. 
37 See Bachelor, supra note 35, at 7-8. 
38 For a discussion of the Poletown area during this time, see Bukowczyk, supra note 30. 
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borhood known as Poletown). Detroit began preparing for establish-
ment of the CIP by doing title work in Poletown,39 to take advantage 
of a new Michigan "quick-take" eminent domain statute,40 a measure 
passed to facilitate economic plans such as this one. 
At that time, Detroit also began preparing a Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement (DEIS)41 for the project. The DEIS considered 
alternative sites, even though Detroit had begun purchasing prop-
erty in the CIP area. 42 In August the city began scoping sessions. 43 
During these sessions, issues concerning the CIP area that were 
salient to the EIS process were identified. A scoping document was 
released on August 29th, 1980. 
That same day the city requested an advance of $60,500,000 for a 
loan guarantee44 from the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD), for commitment to the CIP area. HUD could not 
approve this request until completion and release of the EIS, since 
HUD's approval would represent federal agency action on a project 
requiring an EIS. At this time the city was still preparing the DEIS, 
not the final EIS. 
On September 10, 1980, however, and again on September 22, 
Detroit formally requested that CEQ modify its procedural duties 
under NEPA, under the emergency provisions of the CEQ regula-
tions. 45 The city contended that its horrendous economic condition 
constituted just such an emergency. It relied on the fact that the 
Governor of Michigan had declared a statewide economic emer-
gency.46 In addition, GM had set a firm deadline for the city: if Detroit 
did not turn over the CIP parcel (cleared of buildings) to GM by 
39 Testimony of Emmett S. Moten, Jr., Appellee's Appendix, supra note 28 at app. 71. 
40 Michigan Economic Development Corporations Act, 1980 PA 87, M.C.L. 125.1602, M.S.A. 
5.3520 (22). 
41 The DEIS is required under CEQ Regulations 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (1986). The DE IS must 
satisfy as fully as possible the EIS requirement. In the DE IS the agency must attempt to 
discuss all major points of view on the environmental impacts of the proposed action. Id. Once 
the agency releases the DEIS, it must solicit comments on the document before preparing a 
final EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (1986). 
42 See testimony of Emmett S. Moten, Jr., Appellee's Appendix, supra note 28 at app. 90. 
43 Scoping sessions are required under CEQ Regulations 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(1986). Scoping 
sessions define the issues to be addressed in the EIS. The preparing agency invites all affected 
parties to participate in the scoping process. 
44 See Crosby, 512 F.Supp. at 1380. 
45 See Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 53, Crosby v. Young, 512 F.Supp. 1363 (E.D. 
Mich. 1981). 
46 Letter from Emmett S. Moten, Jr., Director, Community & Economic Development 
Department, City of Detroit to Gus A. Speth, Chairman, CEQ (Sept. 22, 1980)(requesting 
§ 1506.11 exception). 
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May 1, 1981, GM would build its plant elsewhere. 47 It was this firm 
deadline that led to the request for the emergency exception. The 
emergency was thus economic in nature, not environmental. The city 
needed to have financial resources in place to start buying and pre-
paring the land, and to commence eminent domain proceedings. 
Without a funding commitment from HUD by October 1, 1980, the 
city could not ensure that the site would be ready by GM's deadline. 
The city also claimed that it needed to relocate elderly residents out 
of the neighborhood before winter. 48 
Due to these pressures, Detroit alleged-and CEQ agreed-that 
the CIP project could not go forward unless federal financial assis-
tance was in place by October 1. On September 24, CEQ gave the 
city its emergency exemption, with the proviso that Detroit prepare 
the EIS before making any final decision. 49 Six days later, the Detroit 
Economic Development Corporation approved the completed project 
plan. 50 
HUD subsequently granted the city a $60,500,000 loan guarantee. 
On October 15, 1980, Detroit released the DEIS, the Detroit Com-
mon Council approved the project plan for the CIP site. 51 Within a 
month the city began condemnation proceedings on the land within 
the CIP. Since Detroit could now commit funds to the CIP project, 
it seems unlikely that the final EIS could have had much effect in 
substantially altering the project. 
There has been much criticism of Detroit's handling of the decision-
making process. 52 The dissenting judge in a suit brought to block 
condemnation of the CIP property53 stated that the way that Detroit 
"marshalled and applied its resources", 54 and acquired millions of 
dollars to spend on the CIP project before an EIS had been prepared, 
released, and commented upon, made the CIP "a fait accompli before 
47Id. 
48 Id. In fact, the elderly were not relocated before winter and the site was not to be turned 
over to GM until July 1. See Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum Regarding Claim I; Supplemental 
Memorandum on Claim II and III, Crosby v. Young, 512 F.Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
49 Letter from Gus A. Speth, Chairman, CEQ to Coleman A. Young, Mayor of Detroit 
(Sept. 24, 1980)(granting § 1506.11 exception). 
50 The Detroit Economic Development Corporation was the official sponsor of the project. 
It was created by Michigan Public Act 338 (1974, amended 1978). It was responsible for 
creating plans for the project and designating a project area. However, for this project city 
staff had taken over many of the Corporation's functions. For a detailed discussion of the 
Corporation, see Bachelor, supra note 35 at 11-12. 
51 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N. W.2d 455, 468 (Mich. 1981). 
52 See, e.g., id. at 470-471 (Ryan, J., dissenting); Bukowczyk, supra note 30 at 66-67. 
53 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). 
54 Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
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meaningful objection could be registered."55 Detroit simply may not 
have given itself time to encourage citizen participation or objection 
in the EIS process, time which could have had an effect on Detroit's 
final decision. While it was supposed to be considering alternative 
sites and configurations, Detroit was purchasing land and following 
GM's site configuration on the CIP. 
Soon after the final EIS comment period expired and Detroit 
announced the final decision on the CIP site and configuration, res-
idents of the Poletown area filed a suit based on NEPA, Crosby v. 
Young,56 in federal court on March 17, 1981. By this time the city 
either owned, paid for, or had entered into a contract for 1,267 out 
of 1,674 parcels of land,57 and the Wayne County Circuit Court 
confirmed Detroit's title to all the land involved on March 27, 1981.58 
The suit made several allegations, including the charge that CEQ 
could not grant exemptions to the statutory requirements of 
NEP A.59 In discussing the emergency provision, the court noted 
that executive order 11,991 gave CEQ responsibility for enforcing 
NEPA.60 Therefore, CEQ had the responsibility for interpreting 
NEP A's procedural provisions. 61 Accordingly, the court accorded 
substantial deference to CEQ's emergency provision,62 and noted 
that CEQ could therefore "interpret the provisions of NEP A to 
accomodate emergency circumstances."63 The court went on to de-
scribe the gravity of the economic emergency facing the Detroit 
area, and noted alternative arrangements that Detroit and CEQ had 
made. 64 Since the court held CEQ's interpretation of NEP A in sub-
stantial deference, it held that these alternative arrangements ful-
filled NEPA's requirements. 65 
The court was undoubtedly correct in stating that CEQ has re-
sponsibility for interpreting NEPA's procedural provisions. 66 The 
court, however, failed to examine whether CEQ's emergency pro-
55 Id. 
56 512 F.Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
57 Defendants' Brief, supra note 45 at 2. 
58 Id. 
59 Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment, and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Claims II and III at 30, Crosby v. Young, 512 F.Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 





65 Id. at 1386, 1387. 
66 See Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. § 123 (1978). 
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vision, as used in the Crosby case, was a reasonable interpretation 
of CEQ's power under NEPA. NEPA requires an EIS in every 
proposal for major federal action. 67 Executive Order 11,991 gave 
CEQ the power to determine the procedure by which a federal 
agency can comply with the EIS requirement. 68 The Crosby court 
did not discuss the narrow nature of the executive order, which did 
not go beyond creation of a procedural interpretation of NEP A. 
CEQ's emergency exception is not a mere procedural interpretation 
of NEP A; it is a substantive alteration of NEP A's E IS requirement, 
and, therefore, a violation of NEP A. While there is no question of 
Detroit's dire economic situation, the court did not compare CEQ's 
emergency provision against the statute itself and its subsequent 
history, to determine whether Congress intended a waiver of NE-
PA's requirements and creation of alternative arrangements when 
poor economic conditions exist. Finally, by according substantial 
deference to CEQ's interpretation of NEPA, the court failed to do 
its own inquiry into what types of emergency situations would justify 
a departure from NEP A, and whether CEQ was the proper agency 
to be making such a determination. The court instead allowed the 
agency charged with interpreting procedural aspects of NEP A to 
alter the EIS requirement. 
The Comment examines how Congress and the courts have strin-
gently construed the EIS requirement, and the reasons for such a 
narrow construction, indicating that a broad emergency exception 
would be inappropriate unless Congress itself were to mandate such 
a procedure. 
III. THE EIS REQUIREMENT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
A. The Stringency of the EIS Requirement 
Congressional passage of NEP A indicated a desire for controlled 
and planned use of the environment. 69 The EIS requirement is the 
keystone of NEPA, designed to force all federal agencies to consider 
the environmental ramifications of their actions. 70 The purposes of 
the EIS requirement are twofold, in furtherance of that goal: first, 
the EIS should "provide decision makers with an environmental 
disclosure sufficiently detailed to aid in the substantive decision 
whether to proceed with a project in the light of its environmental 
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
68 See supra note 16. 
69 See supra note 4. 
70 See Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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consequences."71 The EIS process fulfills the legislative intent that 
environmental factors be considered throughout the agency decision-
making process. 72 Thus, an agency must consider the environmental 
impacts of its actions "at every distinctive and comprehensive stage 
of the process. "73 
Presumably, this means that Section 102(2)(C) requires advance 
review of environmental factors. The EIS would thus ensure envi-
ronmentally informed decisionmaking at all stages of a project's 
progress. An EIS released after a decision has been made can hardly 
be an aid in the decision-making process. Thus, even CEQ's own 
regulations mandate that agencies "integrate the NEP A process 
with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that plan-
ning and decisions reflect environmental values. "74 The EIS, then, 
is "the outward sign that environmental values have been consid-
ered."75 
A second and equally important function of the EIS is public 
disclosure. 76 The public has a substantial role in the enforcement of 
NEP A. One commentator has called the public a "consultant" in the 
decision-making process. 77 Therefore, the preparer should make the 
EIS available to the public before decisions can be made,78 and also 
solicit public comments before completing the final EIS.79 These 
requirements give the public a role during the decision-making pro-
cess, when comments can have a real, constructive impact. 
In addition to ensuring that citizens are granted a voice in the 
decision-making process, the EIS exposes the preparing agency to 
public criticism to ensure informed decision making.80 An impact 
statement should be sufficiently detailed for the "public to make an 
informed evaluation, "81 and is only sufficient if it enables "those who 
did not have a part in its compilation to understand and consider 
71 Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974). 
72 See Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1117-18. 
73 Id. at 1119. 
74 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (1986). 
75 Andrus V. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979). 
76 See Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs of the United States Army, 325 
F.Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
77 W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.4, p. 727 (1977); see also Grazing 
Fields Farm V. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1073-4 (1st Cir. 1980). 
78 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1986). 
79 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4)(1986). 
80 Silva v. Lynn II, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284--5 (1st Cir. 1973); see also Comment: Environmental 
Impact Statements: Instruments for Environmental Protection or Endless Litigation, 11 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 532, 547-8 (1983). 
81 Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir. 
1983). 
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meaningfully the factors involved. "82 By requiring this public input 
during, and not after, the decision-making process, the EIS ensures 
that agency decisions are not made in a vacuum, and forces the 
agency to make the most reasoned, considered decision possible. 
In summary, the EIS is proof that an agency has considered the 
environmental impacts mandated by the statute. By forcing decision-
makers to consider environmental factors and by giving the public 
an opportunity to review and criticize those same factors, the EIS 
upholds the integrity of the decision-making process.83 
Given the importance of the EIS, reviewing courts have ensured 
the dual function of the document by reviewing whether an agency 
has complied with the procedural requirements of NEP A. 84 Accord-
ingly, courts have held NEP A's requirements to be not flexible and 
have required compliance with NEPA "to the fullest extent possi-
ble,"85 regardless of the administrative difficulties, delays or costs 
due to compliance.86 For example, in Grazing Fields Farm v. Gold-
schmidt,87 Massachusetts state officials had prepared an EIS under 
the authority of the Federal Highway Administration which favored 
a planned highway expansion. 88 The state, however, later prepared 
an addendum to the EIS which responded to new concerns. This 
addendum never became part of the federal EIS, and the final EIS 
merely discussed the new concerns in a footnote. 89 The appeals court 
rejected the federal agency's contention that the EIS, when consid-
ered with other documents supporting the decision, and the admin-
istrative record, was adequate. 90 The court, while indicating that its 
review was essentially to ensure procedural compliance with NEPA, 
82 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1136 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
83 Silva v. Lynn II, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284-5 (lst Cir. 1973). See also Johnston v. Davis, 698 
F.2d. 1088, 1091 (10th Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 
F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir. 1983). 
84 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
85 See Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1119. This case discussed for the first time in detail the 
procedural requirements of § 102(2)( C) of NEP A. The court noted that the procedural require-
ments of § 102(2)(C) were not flexible, but established a "strict standard of compliance." Id. 
at 1112. The language of § 102(2)(C) required agencies to comply with NEPA's directives "to 
the fullest extent possible unless there is a clear conflict of statutory authority," and therefore 
"considerations of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost will not suffice to strip the 
section of its fundamental importance." (emphasis in original) Id. at 1115. 
86 Id. 
87 626 F.2d 1068 (lst Cir. 1980). 
88 Id. at 1070. 
89Id. 
90 Id. at 1070, 1071. 
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ruled that studies or memoranda not contained within an EIS can 
not make a defective EIS adequate. 91 
The court rested its opinion on the importance of the EIS as a full 
disclosure document: the EIS involves other federal agencies in the 
decision-making process and allows public oversight of the process.92 
Other documents in the administrative record but not in the EIS do 
not reach the EIS' audience, and hinder "the endeavors of 
watchdogs"93 and "mute[s] those most likely to identify problems and 
criticize decisions. "94 In sum, a court will require adherence to the 
EIS process since the document is proof that all relevant actors have 
had an opportunity to contribute to a decision. To further that end, 
strict procedural compliance is necessary. 
A federal decision taken before the completion of the EIS process 
would frustrate the goals of timely comment and criticism. There-
fore, courts have long required that agencies prepare an adequate 
EIS before taking action. 95 An opinion by the 8th Circuit Appeals 
Court in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz96 illus-
trates the reasoning behind this requirement. In Butz, the district 
court enjoined logging operations in a wilderness area until the 
Forest Service prepared, among other documents, the EIS.97 On an 
appeal of the injunction, the appeals court noted that, even thQugh 
the agency had completed a draft EIS, there was no compliance with 
NEP A until the Forest Service released the final E IS. 98 To lift the 
injunction would allow logging while the agency was still preparing 
the final EIS, and thus the logging would be federal action before 
the completion of the NEP A process. The court noted: 
Until the final statement has been filed it would only serve to 
give a judicial recognition to the "futility" of the NEP A process 
if the District Court dissolved its injunction on the basis of the 
draft statement. That would constitute an admission that the 
91 I d. at 1072. 
92 Id. at 1073. 
93 Id. at 1073, 1074. 
94 Id. at 1074. 
95 Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 794 (9th Cir. 1975). 
!l6 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
97 Id. at 1316. 
98 Id. at 1323, 1324. The court noted that the DEIS could not be the basis for an agency 
decision. It stated: 
[A] draft statement is not the basis of an agency decision. Its function is to elicit 
comment that will contribute to a final statement, and it is the final statement that 
is supposed to serve as the basis for agency assessment of the environmental impli-
cations of the project. 
Id., quoting Sierra Club v. Mason, 365 F.Supp. 47 (D. Conn. 1973). 
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final decision has already been made without consideration of the 
public reaction and comments to the draft statement. 99 
The court's reasoning for upholding the injunction indicates that a 
critical function of the reviewing court is to ensure that an agency 
has critically evaluated environmental consequences before taking 
action. 100 Without timely compliance, environmental harm may occur 
while an agency is preparing the EIS. 
The strict procedural requirement of the EIS seems to indicate 
that a reviewing court should view any exceptions to NEPA's pro-
cedures suspiciously. A broad emergency exception--especially an 
undefined one-would frustrate the goals of the EIS as outlined 
above. An emergency decision might preclude a full consideration of 
environmental factors. In addition, if action is taken before release 
of an EIS, there is little opportunity for the public to impact the 
NEP A process. Therefore, courts should narrowly construe excep-
tions to NEPA's procedures. The next section will examine occasions 
when courts have allowed such exceptions. 
B. Exceptions from the NEPA Process 
Exceptions from the EIS requirement are rare. In the past, Con-
gress explicitly acted to exempt certain programs from NEPA. If 
Congress has not acted explicitly to exempt a program, a court will 
allow an exception from the EIS requirement only where Congress 
created a direct conflict between NEP A and another statute and 
that conflict precludes compliance with NEP A. lOl This section briefly 
discusses how both types of exceptions from the EIS requirement 
indicate that Congress did not intend CEQ to have the power to 
excuse compliance, but rather reserved such power to itself. 
Congress has allowed exceptions to the E IS process in limited 
circumstances, such as exempting agencies with goals parallel to 
NEPA's.102 Congress also has acted explicitly in rare instances to 
99 I d. at 1324. 
100 See e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1975). 
101 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1115 n.12. There is no national security exemption from 
NEPA. See Concerned about Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1977), but 
under the Freedom of Information Act, in certain situations the government may not have to 
disclose whether it complied with NEPA. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense V. Catholic Action 
of HawaiilPeace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143-46 (1981). 
102 Congress has, for instance, exempted the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from 
NEPA's requirements in certain situations, because EPA carries out its own program for 
environmental protection, which is considered the functional equivalent of NEPA. Thus, 
Congress has protected EPA's jurisdiction over air and water quality by exempting EPA's 
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continue a program that otherwise would be delayed or stopped by 
NEPA.103 For example; NEPA litigation caused a stoppage of work 
on the Alaska pipeline. Congress was able to restart the project by 
enacting legislation making the President's decisions on the adequacy 
of an EIS conclusive and denying judicial review. 104 
An exception from NEP A is far more likely to occur, however, 
when Congress has acted to create direct conflicts with the NEP A 
statute, based on either a specific deadline or a strict time constraint. 
In these cases an agency may not be able to comply with NEP A due 
to the statutory conflict. 105 In these cases the courts must, of neces-
sity, scrutinze carefully for evidence of statutory conflict. 
The Supreme Court considered this issue in Flint Ridge Devel-
opment Company v. Scenic River Association of Oklahoma. 106 In 
duties under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982) and the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) from NEPA requirements. See Environmental Defense Fund v. 
EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Rucklehaus, 486 F.2d 
375, 384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Thus, Congress has protected EPA's jurisdiction over air and 
water quality by exempting EPA's duties under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642, 
and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 from NEPA. 
103 See Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 719(h)(c)(3) (1982); The Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 154, 87 Stat. 250, 275 (1973). Other projects 
exempted from NEPA include the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 
1974, 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (1982); Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5175 (1982); and 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 45 U.S.C. § 791(c) (1976). See also R. DICKERSON, 
THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 234-35 (1975). 
104 See Earth Resources Co. of Alaska v. FERC, 617 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Congres-
sional withdrawal of funding from a project is still another method of nullifying NEPA 
compliance. For example, work on the San Antonio freeway had been suspended pending 
NEPA litigation. Congress passed Section 154(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-47, 87 Stat. 250 (1973), which stated, "[tlhe contractual relationship between 
the Federal and State governments shall be ended with respect to all portions of the San 
Antonio North Expressway ... and the expressway shall cease to be a Federal Aid Project." 
Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 154(a), 87 Stat. 250, 275 (1973). Congress withdrew federal funding from 
the project to cause it to cease to be a major federal action under § 102(2)(c) and to make 
NEPA's EIS requirement inapplicable to the project. See Named Individual Members of the 
San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dept. (II), 496 F.2d 1017,1022 (5th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975). 
These examples indicate that the City of Detroit could also have used the political process 
to seek an exemption from NEPA's requirements. Congress itself would then have determined 
whether the economic conditions overrode congressional desires as exhibited in NEPA. Had 
Congress desired to exempt the CIP from NEPA, it could have done so. 
Also, courts have noted that limitations on NEPA review need a clear congressional state-
ment to be effective. For example, courts have not allowed defendants to argue that Congress, 
by appropriating funds for a project, has intended that the project be exempted from NEPA 
review. See e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1066-67 n.10 
(1977); The Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg (I), 463 F.2d 783, 785 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971); National Audubon Society v. Andrus, 442 F.Supp. 42, 45 (D. D.C. 1977). 
106 See Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1115 n.12. 
106 426 U.S. 776 (1976). 
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Flint Ridge, developers were required under the Interstate Land 
Sales Disclosure Acp07 to file a statement of record, which disclosed 
information about subdivisions they were developing. l08 Such state-
ments would become effective within thirty days, unless within that 
time the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) de-
termined that the statement was incomplete or inaccurate. 109 
The Flint Ridge Development Company had filed a statement of 
record relating to development of property along a river in north-
eastern Oklahoma. llo Two nonprofit conservation organizations pe-
titioned HUD to prepare an EIS before allowing the statement of 
record to become effective. l11 HUD did not prepare an EIS and the 
organizations filed suit. 112 The court of appeals ruled that HUD's 
review of the statement was a major federal action requiring prep-
aration of an EIS.ll3 
The question for decision was whether HUD should have prepared 
an EIS for the proposed development. The Supreme Court held that 
the Land Sales Disclosure Act required that HUD complete its 
review of the statement of record on the development within thirty 
days.114 Since HUD could not possibly prepare a full EIS in such a 
short time, a statutory conflict existed between the Land Sales 
Disclosure Act and NEP A.115 The court noted that "the duty NEPA 
imposes upon the agencies to consider environmental factors (should) 
not be shunted aside in the bureaucratic shuffle. "116 Yet the court 
also recognized that "where a clear and unavoidable conflict in sta-
tutory authority exists, NEP A must give way. "ll7 Since the Disclo-
sure Act imposed a strict time schedule on HUD, HUD would not 
have time to' prepare an EIS and therefore the court would not 
require one. 118 
Problems of time constraints have arisen in another context. Once 
Congress acts to meet an "emergency," the federal agencies created 
pursuant to that action may not need to satisfy NEP A. In these 
107 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1982). 
108 Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 777-80. 
109 Id. at 78l. 
110 I d. at 782. 
111 Id. 
112Id. at 782-3. 
113 I d. at 784. 
114Id. at 790. 
115 I d. at 790-l. 
116Id. at 787. 
117 I d. at 788. 
118 Even so, the Court emphasized that the Secretary could have other duties under NEPA 
than those barred by the Disclosure Act. See id. at 792. 
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cases courts have excused compliance with NEP A due to Congress' 
determination of the exigent circumstances of the emergency. An 
examination of these cases reveals that Congress can mandate swift 
action to meet an emergency, and thus create a conflict which pre-
vents compliance with NEPA. The inference is that when Congress 
intends an emergency exception from NEPA it will affirmatively 
create one. A court can then affirm the override of NEPA on review. 
Several cases have discussed what situations would constitute such 
an emergency. In Cohen v. Price Commission,119 the Price Commis-
sion was a temporary agency created by the President120 under 
provisions of the 1971 amendments to the Economic Stabilization 
Act of 1970 (the "Act").121 Given the unstable economic conditions 
prevalent at that time, the Commission had a mandate to act swiftly 
to control prices. 122 In Cohen, the Commission allowed fare increases 
to the N ew York transportation system. 123 Those opposing the in-
crease complained that the new fares would lead to increased vehic-
ular traffic in N ew York City, and, consequently, more air pollution. 
These factors, therefore, would necessitate preparation of an EIS.124 
The federal district court reasoned that to achieve the purpose of 
the Act, officials "must be free to act with promptness and dis-
patch. "125 The procedures for complying with the provisions of NEP A 
by creating an EIS would require a great expenditure of time. The 
Commission would not be able to implement its mandate if it was 
required to undergo the lengthy EIS process before authorizing 
increases in the price of goods. 126 Therefore, the court noted it was 
unlikely that NEP A was applicable to the Price Commission, due to 
the need for swift action. 127 
119 337 F.Supp. 1236 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). 
120 See Exec. Order No. 11,627 § 8, 3 C.F.R. 621, 625 (1971). 
121 Amendments to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743 
(1971). 
122 [d. at 85 Stat. 744. 
123 Cohen, 337 F.Supp. at 1238. 
124 [d. at 1239. 
125 [d. at 1240. 
126 [d. at 1242. The court noted that "a fair reading of the provisions of NEPA and the 
Economic Stabilization Act, and their respective basic purposes indicates substantial questions 
as to whether NEPA is applicable to the Price Commission-a temporary agency and one 
intended to act upon matters within its authority with dispatch" id. at 1241, and noted that 
compliance with NEPA would frustrate the objectives for which the Economic Stabilization 
Act was passed. 
Congress had freed the Commission from the provisions of the Administrative Procedures 
Act and had limited the powers of the courts to issue injunctive relief, indicating its desire to 
afford the Commission the ability to act with dispatch in carrying out its mandate. [d. at 1242. 
127 [d. at 1241-42. 
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Similarly, in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Simon128 an oil company sued 
to enjoin mandatory allocaton of crude oil and other petroleum prod-
ucts. The Federal Energy Office created regulations for this alloca-
tion which were based on the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
of 1973. 129 Congress decided that "immediate emergency action was 
necessary to avoid foreseen catastrophic nationwide consequences of 
a critical shortage of . . . oil. "130 Congress required announcements 
of the regulations within fifteen days after the effective date of the 
statute, and the regulations were to take effect fifteen days there-
after. 131 The court held that the lengthy period of time required for 
promulgation of an EIS was in direct conflict with the short period 
Congress had provided for building a nationwide scheme of alloca-
tion. 132 The court thus allowed the mandatory schemes to take effect 
without fulfilling the requirements of NEP A. 133 
Thus, when Congress defines a situation as an emergency, a re-
viewing court will exempt that situation from the EIS requirement. 
Indeed, Congress legislated to meet national economic, and oil and 
gas emergencies, as noted above. The nature of the limited excep-
tions Congress granted would seem to indicate that, in the absence 
of such emergency conditions, federal agencies must comply with 
NEPA. In contrast, the Crosby court allowed CEQ, not Congress, 
to declare that an economic recession justified an exception from the 
EIS requirement. In Crosby, no statute conflicted with NEPA to 
128 502 F.2d 1154 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974). 
129 Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 751, 87 Stat. 627, § 4(A) 
(1982). 
130 Gulf Oil, 502 F.2d at 1156. 
131 Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 753(a) (1982). 
132 The court noted that "[iln these circumstances, Congress must have intended that the 
President proceed forthwith to allocate oil supplies without the elaborate formal determination 
of environmental impact for which the National Environmental Policy Act provides." ld. at 
1157. 
133 ld. There have been other cases dealing with emergency gas and oil allocation. In 
particular, in American Smelting and Refining Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the 
Federal Power Commission had a duty flowing directly from its enabling statute, the Natural 
Gas Act (52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717) to "take effective curtailment action in the exigencies 
provided by gas shortages." ld. at 948, quoting Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142, 
150 (5th Cir. 1973). The court held that this requirement precluded NEPA compliance, but 
warned: 
A federal agency which seeks to excuse itself from its duties under § 4332(2)(C) [the 
EIS requirementl cannot do so by simply ignoring that statute. Rather, it must make 
express findings which demonstrate the "statutory conflict" which prohibits compli-
ance.ld. 
This agency's emergency power flowed directly from its enabling statute, suggesting that if 
Congress had intended for CEQ to possess emergency power in limited situations, it could 
have given CEQ that authority. 
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create severe time constraints or the like, and the emergency in 
Crosby was local in nature, not national in scope. 134 
The pattern of congressional exemptions from NEPA indicates 
that, absent specific authority to do so, CEQ did not possess any 
power to alter the EIS requirement. Thus, the promulgation of the 
emergency exception may have been ultra vires, and undeserving of 
any deference. CEQ cannot act to alter what NEPA requires. This 
Comment now takes up this question. 
IV. LEGAL DEFICIENCIES IN § 1506.11: ULTRA VIRES, 
DEFERENCE AND DEFINITIONS 
The fact that a procedurally correct EIS is necessary for NEPA 
compliance and that all exceptions from the EIS procedure are due 
to congressional action should alert a reviewing court to close scru-
tiny of § 1506.11. Rigorous scrutiny would reveal three possible 
failings of § 1506.11. First, § 1506.11 may be ultra vires with respect 
to both the executive order that authorized the CEQ regulations and 
NEPA itself. Second, a reviewing court should not grant CEQ's 
emergency exception substantial deference, but rather should de-
termine whether § 1506.11 is reasonable in light of the history of 
NEP A and the few exceptions to it. Finally, by not defining the 
term "emergency" in its regulation, CEQ created the possibility of 
more expansive interpretations of emergencies requiring exceptions 
than necessary under NEP A. 
A. The Ultra Vires Problem 
By promulgating an emergency exception which may allow non-
compliance with the EIS requirement, CEQ may have gone beyond 
134 The Crosby situation stands in stark contrast to the usual pattern of emergency excep-
tions from the NEPA requirements. To illustrate, in Dry Color Manufacturers Association, 
Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973), the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq (1982)) had provided for the issuance of emergency temporary 
standards by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (§ 650(c)(1)), if 
OSHA found that grave danger existed to employees from exposure to substances believed 
to be toxic or physically harmful and that such an emergency standard was necessary to 
protect the employees. 
OSHA created such a standard without first filing an EIS, although a DEIS was released 
shortly after issuing the standard. The court provided the temporary standard with an 
exception from NEPA compliance, holding that the need to provide quick protection to 
employees against serious health risks outweighed the EIS requirement. [d. at 108. Unlike 
Crosby, in which a DEIS was released shortly after the emergency exception had been 
granted, in Dry Color there was statutory authorization to move swiftly in an emergency 
national in scope. 
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the scope of authority granted it by executive order 11,991, which 
authorized binding regulations that set up procedures for compliance 
with NEPA. Such action therefore would have been ultra vires. 
To determine whether an agency's actions are ultra vires, a court 
must examine whether an agency has acted outside the authority its 
enabling statute confers upon it. 135 Thus, a court can sustain a reg-
ulation only if the agency remained within the bounds of delegated 
authority. 136 With ultra vires review, courts do not accord an agency 
the same deference that occurs in other areas of administrative 
law. 137 
When NEPA was originally passed into law, CEQ was to be 
merely an advisory and research body, and Congress did not delegate 
to CEQ any rulemaking authority whatsoever.138 However, in 1977 
Executive Order 11,991 gave CEQ such authority.139 The order ex-
pressly directed CEQ to implement NEP A's procedural provisions 
through regulations which would be binding upon all federal agen-
cies. 140 The regulations had three main aims: to reduce paperwork, 
to reduce delays, and to produce better decisions. 141 Thus, the ex-
ecutive order seemed to expand the procedural duties of CEQ to 
ensure compliance with NEPA. 
The executive order did not, and indeed could not, grant CEQ any 
authority to modify NEP A substantively. 142 Beyond explicity stating 
that the purpose of the order was to authorize procedural imple-
mentation of NEP A,143 the order also directed full agency compliance 
135 See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(c) (1982). 
136 Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983). 
137 See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 
1422-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278,291-92 (1965). 
133 Ordinarily, courts will give more deference to a regulation promulgated under express 
congressional authorization than a rule merely interpreting its statute. See DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 710-711 (2d ed. 1978). 
139 Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978), 42 Fed. Reg. 26,767 (1977). 
140 Exec. Order No. 11,991 § 1(h), 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978). 
141 See Implementation of Procedural Provisions, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, codified at 40 C.F.R. 
1500 (1986). All federal agencies would follow an "efficient, uniform procedure," id., for 
carrying out NEPA'a requirements, to make the EIS process more useful, and to lead to a 
more focused approach to environmental issues. See Exec. Order No. 11,991, § l(h), 3 C.F.R. 
123 (1978). 
142 At the time the Executive Order was promulgated, there was some doubt as to its 
validity, since NEPA did not grant the President authority to make binding regulations. 
However, this authority has never been seriously questioned since the Andrus case accorded 
substantial deference to CEQ's new regulations. For a discussion of the President's authority 
to issue these regulations, see McDermott, New Regulations of the Council on Environmental 
Quality, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 114-118 (1979). 
143 See supra note 140. 
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with CEQ's new regulations unless "inconsistent with statutory re-
quirements. "144 This language refers back to NEPA, and NEP A 
demands compliance to the fullest extent possible. 145 Courts have 
interpreted "to the fullest extent possible" to mean an agency must 
comply with NEPA unless compliance would be inconsistent with 
statutory authority.146 Both the legislative and judicial history of 
NEPA strongly suggest that a federal agency contemplating major 
action must prepare an EIS unless statutory law does not require 
such preparation. 147 The executive order would seem to have autho-
rized no new exceptions to compliance with NEP A's procedural pro-
visions. 
As drafted, § 1506.11 confines itself to an exception of CEQ's own 
detailed procedures for compiling an EIS, not the NEPA require-
ment that an EIS accompany major federal action. The language of 
§ 1506.11 authorizes a federal agency to act in an emergency "with-
out observing the provisions of these regulations." (emphasis sup-
plied)l4B By waiving only its own regulations, CEQ would have re-
mained within the procedural authority granted it by Executive 
Order 11,991, since it would not waive or modify compliance with 
NEP A, but merely waive compliance with detailed CEQ procedures. 
In Crosby, however, a § 1506.11 exemption allowed action well be-
fore the release of the EIS, contrary to the requirements of NEPA. 
As a result of the Crosby court's failure to review ultra vires 
questions, Detroit used § 1506.11 as a vehicle for substantively mod-
ifying NEPA by taking action before fulfilling the EIS requirement. 
The court accorded substantial deference to CEQ, noting only that 
responsibility for NEPA enforcement was delegated to CEQ.149 Rig-
orous review would have addressed the ultra vires problem. Exec-
utive Order 11,991 authorized only a set of procedures for 
"compliance"15o with, not exceptions from, NEP A, and authorized 
exemptions only when direct conflict with statutory authority was 
present. l5l Therefore, § 1506.11, as used in Crosby, was ultra vires 
with respect to Executive Order 11,991. 
144 Exec. Order No. 11,991 § 2(g), 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978). 
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). 
146 See Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 787-88; see also 115 CONGo REC. 39,703 (1969). (House 
Conferees); id. at 40,418 (Senate Conferees). 
147 See supra notes 69-134 and accompanying text. 
148 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (1986). 
149 Crosby, 512 F.Supp. at 1386. 
150 See supra note 139. 
151 [d. 
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Section 1506.11 also is inconsistent with NEPA itself. There is no 
provision in NEP A, its legislative history or subsequent modifica-
tions that would give CEQ any rulemaking power. NEP A requires 
preparation and release of an EIS for any major federal action that 
significantly affects the quality of the human environment. 152 It does 
not provide any exception for emergency situations. Thus, while an 
agency may not have to comply with the detailed and time consuming 
CEQ regulations in an emergency situation,l53 it would still have to 
prepare and release an EIS before making any decision. There have 
been indications that courts might accept an EIS with expedited 
proceduresl54 or an abbreviated comment period. 155 In the absence 
of statutory conflict, however, federal agencies must comply with 
the EIS requirement in timely fashion. 156 Nothing in NEPA gives 
CEQ the authority to modify this requirement. 
By neglecting to inquire whether CEQ had authority to excuse 
full compliance with NEPA's EIS requirement, the court negated 
full and timely considerations of environmental values and public 
criticism at an early stage in the EIS process. Thus, Detroit could 
not possibly utilize the two most important functions of the EIS in 
a timely fashion. 157 
Because the court did not address the ultra vires issue, § 1506.11 
can currently create a major change in the EIS requirement. The 
possibility of undermining NEP A through § 1506.11 now exists. Fu-
ture litigants will now have to address whether CEQ's ability to 
interpret NEP A through § 1506.11 should be given the substantial 
deference that the Crosby court afforded it. 
B. Problems of Deference 
In Crosby, the court noted that it was according substantial de-
ference to CEQ's interpretation of the NEP A statute. 158 An exami-
nation of the role of CEQ in the NEPA scheme and why courts grant 
deference to an agency interpreting its mandate159 reveals that, in 
152 42 u.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
153 See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (1986). 
154 See Sierra Club v. Hassell, 636 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1981). 
155 See State of Alaska v. Carter, 462 F.Supp. 1155, 1164 (D. Alaska 1978). 
156 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1115 n.12. 
157 The Crosby court simply stated that CEQ had the authority to interpret NEPA to 
"accomodate emergency situations." Crosby, 512 F.Supp. at 1386. 
153 Id. 
159 For a discussion of how courts treat issues of statutory construction, see Diver, Statutory 
Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1985); Comment, A 
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dealing with emergencies, CEQ's interpretation of NEPA was not 
reasonable and should not have been given deference. 
Congress established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
in Title II of NEPA.160 CEQ was to act as the President's advisor, 
review agency compliance with NEP A, and be a conduit for infor-
mation to the public. 161 Shortly after passage of NEPA, however, 
President Nixon issued an executive order which refined CEQ's 
responsibilities. 162 The executive order directed CEQ to publish 
guidelines for preparation of environmental impact statements. 163 
These guidelines were not binding, and CEQ had no power to enforce 
regulations governing compliance with the Act. l64 CEQ acquired 
power to issue mandatory regulations only through Executive Order 
11,991. 
CEQ is the administrator of the NEP A statute. It regulates all 
agencies of the federal government to ensure procedural compliance 
with NEPA's environmental mandate. 165 It is thus expert in envi-
ronmental matters, and in general its regulations speak to proce-
dures for complying with an environmental mandate. 166 Thus, CEQ 
is "most familiar with its requirements" for an EIS.167 
In promulgating § 1506.11, CEQ must have interpreted NEPA to 
provide for an emergency exception to the EIS requirement. A 
review of the reasonableness of that interpretation would indicate 
that there was no basis upon which CEQ could base such a broad 
emergency provision. Therefore, a discussion of the standard of 
review for agency interpretation of its statutory mandate is in order. 
In determining whether an agency's interpretation of its statute 
is entitled to deference, a court must decide whether Congress has 
clearly spoken to the issue under consideration. l68 If so, the court 
Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency's Statutory Interpretation, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469 
(1985). 
160 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342-4347 (1982). 
161 See 42 u.s.c. § 4344 (1982). 
162 Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1966-1970 Compilation). 
163 Exec. Order No. 11,514 § 3(h) required CEQ to issue "guidelines to federal agencies for 
the preparation of detailed statements on proposals for legislation and other federal actions 
affecting the environment." 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978). 
164 See e.g., Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412,421 (2d Cir. 1972); Hiram 
Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973). 
165 See Exec. Order No. 11,991 § l(b), 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978). 
166Id. 
167 Warm Springs Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1310 (1974). 
168 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S.Ct. 2778, 
2781 (1984). 
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must give effect to the congressional action. 169 Thus, a court will 
examine the language, purpose and history of an act to determine 
the legislative intent. 170 No court should defer to an agency inter-
pretation of a statute if that agency is interpreting the statute in a 
way that frustrates the purpose or is inconsistent with the statute 
itself.l7l 
Generally, only when a statute is silent on the issue in question, 
or if the legislative intent is ambiguous, should a court look to the 
agency interpretation. 172 A court must determine whether an inter-
pretation of a statute carries out the policies behind it and makes 
those policies attainable. 173 At that stage review is to be deferential, 
asking only if the interpretation is reasonable. 174 A court may not 
substitute its own construction for a reasonable interpretation made 
by an agency.175 Thus, a court, in reviewing CEQ's interpretation of 
NEP A, should examine whether NEP A provides for emergencies, 
or if the CEQ interpretation is contrary to congressional intent. 
The question, then, is whether Congress intended to permit an 
exception to NEP A in emergencies. Although NEP A is silent on 
emergency exceptions, the language of the statute, its legislative 
and judicial history all seem to indicate that the only exceptions from 
compliance with NEPA should come from congressional action. 176 
NEPA requires that an EIS accompany any major federal action,177 
and also mandates agency compliance with the EIS process "to the 
fullest extent possible."178 Legislative history indicates that one 
should interpret this phrase as "unless inconsistent with a statutory 
169 Id.; Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 
1102, 1108 (1984). 
170 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979). 
171 Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 
32 (1981). 
172 Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. 
173 National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 482 F.2d 672, 689 
(D.C. Cir. 1973). 
174 See Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2782; Chemical Manufacturers, 105 S.Ct. at 1108. 
175 See Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2782; Chemical Manufacturers, 105 S.Ct. at 1108; Kunakana 
v. Clark, 742 F.2d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 1984); Eagle Picher Industries, Inc. v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 759 F.2d 922, 927 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1985). While the reviewing 
court must give deference to an agency interpretation, courts are the final arbiters of statutory 
construction. See e.g., Federal Election Comm'n, 454 U.S. at 32; Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 
390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968). 
176 See supra notes 69-134 and accompanying text. 
17742 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C) (1982). 
178 Id. 
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mandate."179 Prior to Crosby, courts allowed exceptions to the EIS 
requirement only when Congress legislated to meet what it defined 
to be an emergency.180 Thus, Congress seems to have reserved to 
itself the power to modify NEP A. Congress could not have intended 
for CEQ to alter this scheme, since it did not delegate any rulemak-
ing authority to CEQ. To allow CEQ to do so by interpretation, 
then, is contrary to the intent of Congress. 181 The Crosby court, by 
ruling that CEQ could interpret NEPA to "accomodate emergency 
situations"182 allowed a $30 million loan authorization for work on 
the CIP site without preparation and release of an EIS as required 
by NEPA.l83 
A similar failure to adequately review CEQ's determination of an 
emergency situation occurred in National Audubon Society v. Hes-
ter.l84 In Audubon, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in attempt-
ing to preserve the California condor, decided to bring all remaining 
wild condors into captivity. 185 This represented a change from FWS' 
prior policy. 186 FWS requested and received from CEQ an emergency 
exemption because of the bird's condition in the wild. CEQ accepted 
this reasoning and did not require immediate documentation of the 
environmental effects of FWS' decision. 187 The appeals court upheld 
the agency's action, holding that the agency was not altering its 
policy so much as adapting its rules to changing circumstances. l88 
The court satisfied itself that the agency adequately justified its 
change in policy. 189 
The appeals court gave scant attention to CEQ's grant of the 
emergency exemption. In a footnote, it overturned the district 
court's independent review of the emergency exception, noting only 
179 See supra note 12. 
180 See supra notes 106--34 and accompanying text. 
181 Courts generally do accord CEQ's interpretation of NEPA substantial deference. See 
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). However, in this instance, when examining 
an interpretation allowing noncompliance with NEPA, which is in conflict with a judicial 
history of forcing strict compliance with the EIS process, a court should not accord CEQ 
substantial deference. For a discussion of the appropriate amount of judicial deference due to 
CEQ, see Comment, NEPA After Andrus v. Sierra Club: The Doctrine of Substantial Defer-
ence to the Regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality, 66 VA. L. REV. 843 (1980). 
182 Crosby, 512 F.Supp. at 1386. 
183 Id. at 1386, 1387. 
184 801 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
185 Id. at 406. 
186 Id. 
187Id. 
188 Id. at 408. 
189Id. 
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that "CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial defer-
ence."190 As in Crosby, the appeals court failed to go beyond this 
declaration and examine in any manner the emergency exception 
itself. The district court, while not examining whether CEQ had the 
authority to promulgate an emergency exception, had at least scru-
tinized carefully the request for an exemption. 191 The district court 
noted that there was a lack of documentation supporting the emer-
gency request. 192 FWS viewed its action as an emergency "due to 
the precipitous decline in the number of Condors in the past year. "193 
Six condors had been lost in that year. 194 The district court noted 
that the condors were lost over eight months prior to the FWS 
emergency request. 195 During that time FWS could conceivably have 
prepared a more than adequate EIS. Therefore, the district court 
decided that the emergency exemption was suspect due to the lack 
of an adequate record supporting a need for such an exemption. 196 
The district court decided to narrowly construe any emergency 
exemption because NEP A demands compliance to the fullest extent 
possible. 197 In overturning this decision the appeals court did no 
more than give CEQ's emergency determination susbstantial defer-
ence without addressing the concerns of the district court. Such 
deference disserves NEP A when CEQ is allowing noncompliance 
based on a scanty record, which provides little justification for an 
emergency exceptioll. This willingness to give total deference to 
CEQ's actions ensures that an agency charged with enforcing pro~ 
cedural compliance with NEPA will continue to alter the EIS re-
quirement substantively, without congressional authorization. Pull-
ing back the veil of deference would reveal the flaws in § 1506.11. 
Assuming arguendo that CEQ could interpret NEP A to accomo-
date emergencies, no court should accord substantial deference to 
190 Id., n.3, quoting Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). Yet in Andrus, the 
Supreme Court was not granting deference to a CEQ determination that an exception from 
NEP A was necessary, but to CEQ regulations dealing with agency appropriations requests 
not requiring an EIS. Id. at 358-9. In contrast, an emergency exemption excuses compliance 
with NEPA itself when CEQ would otherwise have determined that an EIS is necessary. 
CEQ deserves deference when deciding that an EIS is necessary; once it determines that 
there is a need for an EIS, it is substantially modifying NEPA by allowing noncompliance. 
Therefore, there should be little deference to an administrative decision to grant an emergency 
exception. 
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CEQ's decisions on whether an emergency has occured, unless the 
circumstances bringing about the emergency are environmental in 
nature. In an environmental emergency, CEQ would possess suffi-
cientexpertise to warrant deference from a reviewing court. 198 CEQ 
can make no such claim to expertise in determining other types of 
emergency situations, such as an economic recession, or an oil short-
age, for instance. Congress, which has acted in the past to meet 
these situations, possesses far more expertise than CEQ. When a 
federal agency requests emergency designation so as not to comply 
with NEP A it is inappropriate for .a reviewing court to defer to an 
agency that Congress did not intend to deal with various emergen-
cies. 
C. Emergencies under NEPA 
Instead of merely acceding to CEQ's judgment of what constitutes 
an emergency justifying noncompliance with NEPA, a reviewing 
court should make its own decision as to what qualifies as an emer-
gency based on NEPA and its history. In a federal case, Colon v. 
Carter,199 the district court did such an examination of emergencies 
under NEPA, but outside the context of § 1506.11. In Colon, Pres-
ident Carter had declared a state of emergency under the Disaster 
Relief Act. 200 This declaration was made in order to facilitate transfer 
of Cuban and Haitian refugees from an overcrowded and unsanitary 
facility in Florida to Puerto Rico. The government claimed that this 
declaration triggered provisions in the Federal Disaster Assistance 
Act which expressly nullified the EIS provisions of NEPA.201 
The district court held that although a presidential declaration of 
emergency was entitled to "great deference, "202 review of that dec-
198 One court, in a recent NEPA case, noted that "deference ... is appropriate when the 
disputed issue is one expressly delegated to an agency that deals exclusively with the area 
and so has refined an expertise in its nuances." Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United 
States Dep't of Agric., No. 85-2000, slip op. (lOth Cir., April 17, 1987). 
199 507 F.Supp. 1026 (D. P.R. 1980). 
200 Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. (1982). 
201 The Federal Disaster Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5175 (1982) reads: 
No action taken or assistance provided pursuant to section 5145,5146, or 5173 of this 
title, or any assistance provided pursuant to section 5172 or 5189 of this title t4at 
has the effect of restoring facilities substantially as they existed prior to the disaster, 
shall be deemed a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 .... Nothing in this section shall alter or affect the applicability of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 . . . to other Federal actions taken under this 
chapter or under any other provision of law. 
202 Colon, 507 F.Supp. at 1031. 
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laration was appropriate. 203 The court noted that it must interpret 
the President's emergency declaration strictly, due to "the strong 
policy determinations expressed by Congress in NEPA. "204 The court 
went on to review the presidential declaration accordingly, and held 
that the Federal Disaster Relief Act applied only to natural disas-
ters,205 and that the refugee situation in Florida could hardly qualify 
as a natural disaster. 206 Thus, even though Colon dealt with a pres-
idential declaration of emergency under a separate statute, the court 
still examined the legal bases behind that declaration, and refused 
to hold up the shield of substantial deference. In contrast, the Crosby 
court did not perform any such inquiry. Regardless of the amount 
of deference the court gave to CEQ, the court should have done such 
an inquiry. 
Inquiry would have revealed that, as noted above, NEPA does 
not provide for any emergency exception, and, until Crosby, the only 
emergency exceptions allowed were congressionally mandated. 
CEQ, by promulgating an emergency exception with the term 
"emergency" undefined, left to its own determination what situations 
would qualify as emergencies. In Crosby, an economic recession was 
found to be a sufficient emergency to alter the EIS requirement. 207 
203 [d. 
204 [d. at 1032. 
205 [d. The tenn "emergency" in the Disaster Relief Act is defined as: 
"Emergency" means any hurricane, tornado, stonn, flood, high water, wind-driven 
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snow-
stonn, drought, fire, explosion, or other catastrophe in any part of the United States 
which requires Federal emergency assistance to supplement State and local efforts 
to save lives and protect property, public health and safety or to avert or lessen the 
threat of a disaster. 
42 U.S.C. § 5122 (1982). 
206 Colon, 507 F.Supp. at 1032. Two days after this decision, Congress passed and President 
Carter signed the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-422, 94 Stat. 
1799 (1980). Section 501(c)(3) of that Act stated that federal action granting assistance under 
§ 501(c)(l) "for the processing, care, maintenance, security, transportation and initial reception 
and placement in the United States of Cuban and Haitian entrants" would not be considered 
a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, thus 
exempting.those actions from NEPA's EIS requirements. [d. at § 501(c)(3). The legislative 
history of the Act indicates that REAA was enacted to provide the president with tools for 
dealing with this special situation that did not fit under a traditional emergency definition. 
126 CONGo REC. H. 10111 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980). 
On motion for reconsideration, the district court then lifted its injunction pursuant to tenns 
of the new legislation. Colon, 507 F.Supp. at 1033. See also Colon V. Carter, 633 F.2d 964 
(lst Cir. 1981). This pattern of legislation is instructive for the CEQ emergency situation. In 
Crosby, had there been no procedure for an emergency exception, Congress could have 
exempted Detroit's CIP project from the EIS requirement. 
207 Crosby, 512 F.Supp. at 1386. 
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Yet, under NEP A case law, considerations of economics are not 
supposed to derail the NEP A process. In fact, several courts re-
jected NEPA claims that were based on economic concerns. These 
courts noted that economic impact alone will not justify preparation 
of an EIS.208 An exception exists if the EIS is connected to claims 
involving an effect on the natural or physical environment. 209 Since 
economic concerns do not justify preparing an EIS, economic con-
cerns should not be utilized to avoid preparing an EIS. NEPA is 
concerned with the environment, not economics. 210 Congress, by 
legislation, could always weigh economics more heavily than the 
environment, but there was no such legislation at the time of the 
Crosby decision. 
Thus, in examining an economic emergency request under NEP A, 
a court should keep in mind that considerations of cost and delay are 
not to stop the NEPA process, and that employment is not a concern 
of the Act. In light of the strong national policy considerations in 
NEP A, the local economic problems in Detroit were not such that 
should negate the statute. 211 The economic conditions in Detroit had 
been poor all year. The emergency was not sudden or catastrophic, 
208 See e.g., Breckenridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864, 866-67 (6th Cir. 1976); National Ass'n 
of Government Employees v. Rumsfeld, 418 F.Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1976). In addition, CEQ 
Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1986) note that: 
This means that economic or social effects are not intended by themselves to require 
preparation of an environmental impact statement. When an environmental impact 
statement is prepared and economic or social and natural or physical environmental 
effects are interrelated, then the environmental impact statement will discuss all of 
these effects on the human environment. 
209 National Ass'n of Government Employees, 418 F.Supp. at 1306. 
210 The Breckenridge court noted that NEP A is not "a national employment act." Brecken-
ridge, 537 F.2d at 867. One might argue that while economic concerns should not come into 
play when preparing an EIS it is a different matter when an economic exemption is sought. 
But this would still inject economics into an act not intended to deal with economics. When 
one combines the Colon rationale with the reasoning that economic considerations alone do 
not justify an EIS, it seems that an economic emergency, unless clearly defined by Congress, 
is not such that should trigger an exemption from NEPA's strict requirements. 
211 Even in the Crosby case, it was not the economic emergency itself that caused Detroit 
to seek a commitment of resources before issuing an EIS, but the fact that GM wanted a 
parcel of land given to it by a specified date. One method of alleviating the emergency could 
have been to convince GM to move the deadline back. In fact, GM was not to receive title to 
part of the CIP tract until September 1, 1981. Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Their Motion 
for a Preliminary Injunction, In Opposition to Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment, 
and In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims II and II at 3, Crosby 
v. Young, 512 F.Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981). The two month difference between May 1 and 
September 1 is almost equal to the three month difference between filing the emergency 
request in late September and release of the EIS in December of 1980. Had GM used a July 
1 deadline, there would seem to be little justification for the premature commitment of 
resources. 
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but rather a ramification of an economic downturn. If dire economic 
conditions could constitute an emergency, NEPA could be fraught 
with exceptions during every recession, contrary to the strict EIS 
requirement. 
A reviewing court should realize the strong congressional interest 
in NEP A, and in emergency exceptions from NEP A, and closely 
examine any deviation from congressional requirements. If a court 
is to allow CEQ to make emergency determinations, at the least it 
should review the decision closely. The emergency definition in the 
Disaster Relief Act, noted in C alan, which focuses on catastrophies 
requiring federal assistance, and perhaps may serve as a guide to a 
congressional definition of emergency.212 All other emergencies that 
are not natural in nature should require congressionial consideration 
before granting an exemption from NEP A. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE: § 1506.11 MAY DEPRIVE 
COURTS OF THE ABILITY TO REVIEW AGENCY ACTION IN 
EMERGENCIES 
The role of any court which must review an administrative action 
is heavily dependent upon having an adequate record for review. In 
NEPA, the EIS is the method for compiling that record. The EIS 
is proof that an agency has considered environmental values,213 and 
the EIS as a document can be examined as the record of the agency's 
decision-making process. 
Section 1506.11 can compromise what little judicial review of 
agency decision making now exists. In an emergency situation, an 
agency could release a final EIS months after CEQ granted an 
emergency exception. 214 Thus, contrary to NEPA's purpose, the EIS 
might become a justification for an agency decision, rather than a 
contemporaneous record that ensures consideration of environmental 
alternatives. 215 During that time, the agency may have invested so 
much money and so many resources in a project that upon review a 
court may be unwilling to halt the project now well advanced. 216 
212 See supra note 205. 
213 Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979). 
214 CEQ Regulation 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1986) states that "it is the Council's intention that 
judicial review of agency compliance with these regulations not occur before an agency has 
filed the final [E IS] ... or takes action that will result in irreparable injury." 
215 See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 793-4 (9th Cir. 1975). 
216 A court must decide "whether injunctive relief pending compliance would still serve the 
public interest and the purposes of the Act." Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
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The substantial completion doctrine, which developed soon after 
enactment of NEPA,217 manifests the reluctance of courts to halt 
such projects. This doctrine grew from cases deciding whether 
NEPA should apply retroactively to projects begun before NEPA 
became effective. 218 Courts faced projects in various stages of com-
pletion, ranging from those in which mere approval of a project had 
been given, to others in which there already had been a substantial 
commitment of resources. 219 Recognizing that some projects might 
have advanced so far that to require an EIS would result in an 
empty administrative gesture, courts waived the EIS requirement 
if the "costs of altering or abandoning the project" outweighed 
"whatever benefits might accrue therefrom. "220 Once an agency ir-
reversibly and irretrievably committed its resources toward a proj-
ect, any EIS requirement thereafter applied would be a "meaning-
less formalitY,"221 because most of the environmental harm an EIS 
could have prevented would have already occured. 222 
A set of more recent cases applied the same rationale in a different 
context. Under the equitable doctrine of laches, a court may dismiss 
a NEP A suit if the plaintiff in the action has inexcusably delayed in 
filing suit, and if bringing suit at such a late date unduly prejudices 
the defendant's interest. 223 Courts have adopted substantial comple-
tion as a measurement of undue prejudice in NEP A suits. 224 
217 For a discussion of the development of the substantial completion doctrine, see F. AN-
DERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT, Ch. V, 142--179 (1973). 
218 NEPA took effect on January 1, 1970. 
219 Most of these cases dealt with highway projects. For example, in Morgingside-Lenox 
Park Association v. Volpe, 334 F.Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a highway project had been 
started prior to passage of NEPA, yet the final authorization of funds did not take place until 
well after the passage of NEPA. Most of the right of way had been purchased, but no work 
had begun. The court noted that § 102 was required for a federal project in which there was 
still substantial action to be taken, noting that "while much work had already been taken, the 
court is not dealing with afait accompli." Id. at 144 (emphasis in original). 
220 Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1331 (4th Cir. 1972); cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972). 93.9% of all dwellings in the area had been acquired, 98.5% of 
all businesses had also been acquired, and 75.6% of all families had already been moved out 
of the area. See id. at 1328. 
221 Arlington, 458 F.2d at 1333; City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F.Supp. 578, 595 
(E.D. Mich. 1975). 
222Id. at 1333. See also Shiffler v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 1977). 
223 Courts reviewing environmental cases do not look favorably on a laches defense. See 
Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1975). 
224 See Save Our Wetlands, 549 F.2d at 1028. The court stated that in assessing the degree 
of prejudice it had to "balance the equities, considering both the expenditures that have been 
made by the defendants and the environmental benefits which might result if the plaintiffs 
are allowed to proceed." Id. The court noted that due to the substantial sums expended and 
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Under this line of cases, substantial completion, and undue prej-
udice, occurs when an agency has spent a substantial amount of 
money and has made substantial progress in construction before a 
party brings suit; and if the expenditures in time and money out-
weigh any environmental benefit in enjoining the project. 225 As in 
the earlier retroactivity cases, implementation of this subjective 
standard has proven to be inconsistent. 226 
The use of substantial completion and laches could be devastating 
for plaintiffs attempting to contest a final EIS, or any environmental 
consideration, after CEQ has granted a § 1506.11 exception. Should 
a plaintiff attempt to test the validity of a final EIS and halt a project, 
he or she may find that the defendant already has invested substan-
tial resources in the project and created substantial environmental 
harm. The defendant could then argue that it had achieved substan-
tial completion of the project. Thus, undue prejudice would come 
not from any delay in filing suit but from substantial completion due 
to a § 1506.11 exception ratifying such swift action. A court deciding 
whether it can examine a final EIS, prepared long after a project's 
initiation, must balance the amount of time and money invested into 
the project and the environmental harm that resulted against the 
social benefit obtained by delaying the project until the agency can 
"rewrite" its EIS. The costs of such a temporary abandonment may 
SUbstantially outweigh any benefits of a remedial order forcing the 
agency to revise its EIS, and by extension, the entire project. At 
this late point there may be little a court can do to prevent further 
environmental harm. 
The Crosby fact pattern provides a vivid example of the type of 
situation in which substantial completion and laches might be held 
to apply. CEQ granted Detroit a § 1506.11 exception in late Septem-
ber, 1980227 and a final EIS became official in early February, 1981.228 
the amount of construction, preparation of an EIS would produce little environmental benefit. 
[d. at 1078-9. 
225 [d. at 1027, 1028; see also Watershed Associates, 586 F.Supp. at 985. 
226 Compare Save Our Wetlands, 549 F.2d at 1021 (4% completion and $3.8 million of money 
expended equalled substantial completion) with Steubing, 511 F.2d 489, 522 (2d Cir. 1975)($4.7 
million of money expended and actual construction in progress did not equal substantial 
completion); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975) (30 to 50% of construction 
completed held not sufficient to bar suit). 
227 Letter from Gus A. Speth, Chairman, CEQ to Coleman A. Young, Mayor of Detroit, 
(Sept. 24, 1980)(granting § 1506.11 exception). 
228 Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Claims II and III at 5, Crosby v. Young, 512 F.Supp. 1363 (E.D. 
Mich. 1981). 
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The plaintiffs filed suit soon thereafter. The parties filed briefs in 
federal court in late March, 1981, nearly six months after the emer-
gency declaration. 
The defendants vigorously argued that laches should apply.229 By 
the time plaintiffs were able to file suit challenging the adequacy of 
the final EIS, much irreversible action had occurred. HUD had 
approved a $60,500,000 loan guarantee in October, 1980, after CEQ 
granted it a § 1506.11 exception.230 Since that time the city had 
committed approximately $31,500,000 to the acquisition of prop-
erty,231 demolition work was in progress, and Detroit had purchased 
or contracted to purchase 1267 of 1674 parcels of land involved in 
the project. 232 Actual construction had not yet begun. Although the 
Crosby court did not pass on the defendants' contention, it is con-
ceivable that the court could have considered the commitment of 
such a substantial amount of resources, coupled with relocation of 
homeowners and site preparation, including demolishing the Dodge 
Main facility and other structures in the area, an irretrievable and 
irreversible commitment of resources such that a rewrite of the EIS 
would have a prohibitive cost. 233 
Thus, the § 1506.11 exception could easily short circuit the rigor-
ous review of environmental factors in the EIS by allowing an agency 
to take action before preparing and releasing the EIS. By doing so, 
an agency would disenfranchise actors deemed important to the 
NEP A process-the public234 and other federal agencies.235 A court 
may find itself denied an opportunity for adequate review of the 
EIS, because once substantial completion exists there may be little 
a court can do to prevent further environmental harm. A possible 
solution to this problem would be to leave emergency declarations 
to Congress, or to legislatively add a layer of procedure to the 
emergency provision that would at least involve relevant actors at 
an early stage of the process. 
229 Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6-16, Crosby v. Young, 512 F.Supp. 1363 
(E.D. Mich. 1981). 
230 Crosby, 512 F.Supp. at 1376. 
231 Defendants' Brief, supra note 215 at 2. 
232Id. 
233 The Crosby court did note that "plaintiffs seek a solution which will preserve the buildings 
in Poletown . . . . This goal is difficult of attainment since most of the property in this area 
has been acquired by Detroit through condemnation proceedings." Crosby, 512 F.Supp. at 
1389. 
234 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
236 See id. 
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VI. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: AN EXPEDITED EIS EMERGENCY 
PROCESS 
The CEQ § 1506.11 exception is of dubious legality, and, as inter-
preted, can compromise thorough judicial review of the EIS process. 
One solution to this problem would simply be to do away with 
§ 1506.11 and let Congress deal with any emergencies that might 
justify noncompliance with the EIS process, as has been done in the 
past. 236 
However, there are certainly situations in which it would be pref-
erable to have a simple procedure in place for modifying the EIS 
process. Such situations occurred in the past. For example, in 1983 
CEQ waived requirements of an environmental assessment on 
paperwork237 for NEP A when the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration promUlgated its own emergency regulations to pre-
vent violence between stone crab and shrimp fishermen competing 
off the coast of Florida.238 In 1984, CEQ waived completion of the 
NEP A process to facilitate rapid removal of hazardous asbestos from 
a historic railroad station undergoing renovation.239 In both situa-
tions time was of the essence; in one situation human life was at 
stake and in the other severe environmental harm was likely. An 
emergency exception that would allow swift action seems appropri-
ate in such cases. 240 
The Crosby case, however, demonstrates the need for procedural 
safeguards that would not allow CEQ to abandon its environmental 
protection mission in treating emergency situations. In Crosby, Gen-
eral Motors, a private sector actor, in effect created the emergency 
by setting a deadline that pressured Detroit to act quickly and 
236 For a discussion of the role of Congress in fashioning past etII8J'~Y~~J!l.Ptions from 
NEPA, see text accompanying notes 102-134 . 
237 An environmental assessment is an early stage in the CEQ regulatory scheme that leads, 
in some cases, to preparation of the EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1986). 
238 Letter from Thomas E. Bigford, United States Department of Commerce, to Dinah Bear, 
General Counsel, CEQ (March 17, 1983)(requesting § 1506.11 exception); letter from Dinah 
Bear, General Counsel, CEQ to Thomas E. Bigford, United States Department of Commerce 
(March 24, 1983)(granting § 1506.11 exception). 
239 Letter from David F. Riker, Executive Director, Albany Urban Renewal Agency to 
Dinah Bear, General Counsel, CEQ (undated)(requesting § 1506.11 exception); letter from 
Dinah Bear, General Counsel, CEQ to David F. Riker, Executive Director, Albany Urban 
Renewal Agency (October 17, 1984)(granting § 1506.11 exception). 
240 NEPA failed to provide for these types of situations that require immediate action to 
preserve life or prevent severe environmental harm. This is a fairly common situation. Rules 
that agencies administer can frequently extend by their literal terms to circumstances the 
framers of the law did not foresee. See Comment, Regulatory Values and the Exceptions 
Process, 93 YALE L. REV. 938, 939 (1984). 
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bypass the full NEPA process. 241 Thus the actions of General Motors 
provided justification for Detroit to avoid a federal requirement. 
Without this deadline, there was no need for action before compiling 
an EIS. Yet there was no independent CEQ inquiry into the city's 
time constraints, that is, whether General Motors in fact could move 
to another state in less time than needed for preparation of an EIS.242 
Significantly, the Crosby case is the only instance in which CEQ 
granted an emergency exception on economic grounds. All other 
grants of emergency exceptions have been based on environmental 
concerns.243 In environmental emergencies, CEQ would be the ap-
propriate agency to make such a determination. 
To prevent another such occurrence, there should be a curb on 
CEQ's discretion, judicial or statutory. If CEQ is to decide when an 
emergency can excuse NEPA compliance, there should be a proce-
dure in place that would ensure an independent review of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the emergency request, and the fashioning 
of a solution least harmful to NEP A. Commentators have noted in 
the context of other statutory schemes that an exercise of discretion, 
without standards, procedures or statutory authorization can lead 
to an abuse of discretion, thus risking administrative favoritism and 
abuse. 244 The lack of standards can render review especially difficult 
in emergency situations. 245 
241 See supra text accompanying note 47. 
242 Wherever GM decided to build its plant, an EIS would be required, if there would be 
any federal assistance. It may be that the EIS would be less time consuming in a rural area. 
But, given that GM would have to begin the entire process of negotiation and EIS preparation 
anew elsewhere, it seems incongruous that GM could not merely have waited three months 
for Detroit to release an EIS. 
The Crosby situation falls into what has been described as an "economic hardship exception." 
See Aman, Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules: 1982 
DUKE L.J. 277, 294. Aman discusses an agency's ability to grant exceptions when the economic 
vitality of a project is in great jeopardy. He notes that, even so, any exception must not 
destroy the underlying policy goals of a statute. CEQ granted an economic hardship exception. 
Yet, considerations of expense are not supposed to derail the EIS process. See Shiffler, 548 
F.2d at 103, 104. 
243 The Crosby case is the only instance of an economic exception in CEQ's § 1506.11 file. 
Also, CEQ refuses many requests for emergency exceptions over the phone that it feels are 
inappropriate for an exception, and that therefore are never reflected in files. Telephone 
interview with Dinah Bear, General Counsel, CEQ (April 16, 1987). 
244 One commentator noted that agencies, when entertaining requests for exceptions from 
required procedures, act as courts of equity. Thus, administrative equity deals with the burden 
on a particular individual of a regulatory scheme. Aman, supra note 242 at 278-80. See also, 
Comment, The Exceptions Process: The Administrative Counterpart to a Court of Equity 
and the Dangers It Presents to the Rulemaking Process, 30 EMORY L.J. 1135 (1981). 
245 See Schuck, When the Exceptions Process Becomes the Rule, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 179 
(1984). 
516 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:481 
The process should begin with Congress. Should Congress deter-
mine that an exceptions process for the EIS would be useful, it could 
create one that would operate within narrow bounds and still pre-
serve the goals of NEP A.246 A properly designed exceptions process 
would improve the accountability of CEQ's decision making to such 
key actors in the NEPA process as the public, other federal agencies 
and the courts. By providing CEQ with clear standards, Congress 
could precisely define the situations within which CEQ could 
properly exercise its discretion as those which Congress itself per-
ceives to be an emergency. 247 
The immediacy of action needed in an emergency would call for a 
clear definition of the term, so that CEQ could circumscribe its 
discretion accordingly, and not simply defer to the judgment of the 
applying agency or consume undue time in making determinations. 
For example, California, which based its own environmental protec-
tion statute on NEP A,248 defined its emergency exception as a sud-
den, unexpected occurrence, with great potential for damage to life 
or property.249 That statute gives some examples of what would 
qualify as an emergency: fires, floods, riots and earthquakes. 250 
In the event that such a statutorily defined emergency occurred, 
Congress could then provide a set of procedures for CEQ to follow, 
much like an expedited EIS process, if time allowed. Congress could 
force CEQ to consult the public, by requiring CEQ to hold at least 
one public meeting on the emergency decision. If the emergency 
falls within any other federal agency's area of expertise, CEQ should 
246 Aman has encouraged explict statutory authorization for any exceptions process. Aman, 
supra note 242, at 330. 
247 Accountability is an important safeguard in any exceptions process. There must be 
effective oversight of agency discretion in granting exceptions. "The informal record, written 
criteria, and written decisions of an exceptions process allow members of Congress and their 
staffs to assess the exercise of discretion in special cases." Comment, supra note 240 at 947. 
Without such procedures, the exercise of discretion may offer little justification for a decision. 
Involving all relevant NEPA actors in the exceptions process would effectively insure proper 
oversight of the exercise of CEQ's discretion. 
248 The California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21000-21176 (1977). 
249 The California Environmental Quality Act defines emergency as follows: 
"Emergency" means a sudden, unexpected occurrence, involving a clear and imminent 
danger, demanding immediate action to prevent or mitigate loss of, or damage to, 
life, health, property, or essential public services. "Emergency" includes such occur-
ences as fire, flood, earthquake, or other soil or geologic movements, as well as such 
occurrences as riot, accident, or sabotage. 
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21060.3. 
250 [d. For a discussion of the effectiveness of the California emergency exemption scheme, 
see Comment, The Applications of Emergency Exceptions under CEQA: Loopholes in Need 
of Amendment?, 15 PAC. L.J. 1089 (1984). 
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be required to consult with that agency. Congress could also estab-
lish strict time constraints for raising judicial challenge to the emer-
gency determination. These provisions for public review and an 
informal record would guarantee safeguards against any abuse of 
discretion. 251 
By forcing CEQ to do such an independent review of the emer-
gency request, Congress would provide a check against agencies 
which might try to use the emergency exception to bailout of the 
NEPA process. Thus, even in an emergency, CEQ could at least 
balance environmental concerns against the emergency situation in 
an expedited fashion. In addition, a record of the emergency and the 
environmental considerations that were made before granting an 
exemption would exist at this early stage. A timely challenge could 
rely upon this record and timely review could occur before any major 
commitment of resources. Due to the infrequent nature of these 
emergency determinations, Congress would not overburden CEQ by 
putting an expedited procedure in place for dealing with such emer-
gencies. 
Such an exceptions procedure would still leave room for CEQ to 
exercise its own expertise in environmental matters with an accord-
ingly deferential standard of review. A new exceptions process might 
compare favorably with such processes used in the past. For ex-
ample, the Department of Energy has a congressionally mandated 
exceptions process in place for the Emergency Price Allocation Act 
of 1973 (EPAA).252 The Act was passed due to oil shortages brought 
about by the OPEC embargo. Congress passed the Act to assure an 
equitable distribution of oil at fair prices. 253 Congress then authorized 
the Secretary of Energy to grant relief from "any rule, regulation 
or order issued under [the EPAA] as may be necessary to prevent 
special hardship, inequity or unfair distribution of burdens."254 The 
Agency accordingly set up regulations and guidelines to facilitate 
the exceptions process. 255 Thus, the Department of Energy, expert 
in the pricing and allocation of oil, can determine whether an indi-
vidual company is so adversely affected by the allocation scheme as 
to bear a disproportionate burden of the emergency measures.256 
251 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 240 at 949-50. 
252 Emergency Price Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 751 et seq (1982). 
253 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(I) (1982). 
254 The Department of Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7194 (1982). 
255 10 C.F.R. § 205.176 (1986). 
256 See Bonnafons v. United States Dep't of Energy, 492 F.Supp. 1276, 1280 (D. D.C. 1980). 
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By creating such a procedure, Congress provided a record which 
a court could review, similar to that which an expedited EIS might 
provide. With such a record the court could resume its proper, 
deferential role. Courts have shown great deference to the Depart-
ment of Energy's Office of Hearing Administrator's exceptions de-
cisions because Congress mandated an exceptions process "by its 
very nature designed to resolve unforeseen or unforeseeable factual 
situations in a complex, technical and highly volatile field. "257 A 
Department of Energy order granting exceptions relief will be en-
joined "only on a clear showing that it exceeds the agency's author-
ity, or that it is based on findings not supported by substantial 
evidence. "258 
Thus, a properly designed CEQ emergency exceptions procedure 
would indicate to a court that CEQ was acting within its proper 
sphere of discretion. In such a case, a reviewing court could point 
to procedures and a record as a basis for granting substantial defer-
ence to CEQ's actions. A defined emergency exceptions procedure 
would keep emergency decisions within boundaries set by Congress, 
and would provide a record for a prompt judicial review, while 
preserving discretion for CEQ to meet various types of emergency 
decisions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As presently construed, the CEQ emergency exception seems to 
be a major aberration in the goal of assuring that environmental 
considerations are not shunted aside. The provision goes beyond the 
mandate of authority granted to CEQ by NEP A and the executive 
orders that followed passage of the Act. It also cuts against legis-
lative intent and court interpretation mandating strict compliance 
with the procedures of NEP A, as well as court practice construing 
narrowly any exemptions from NEPA's requirements. The presence 
of such a provision, without adequate procedures to ensure consid-
eration of environmental factors and without building an adequate 
record for public and court review, represents a threat to the goals 
ofNEPA. 
257 See Marathon Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 482 F.Supp. 651, 657 (D. D.C. 1979); 
See also Bonnafons, 492 F.Supp. at 1280. 
258 Marathon Oil, 482 F.Supp. at 657. However, such exceptions processes can develop their 
own difficulties, which can lead to further rulemaking. For a discussion of the Ashland Oil 
exceptions procedures passed on in the Marathon case, see Schuck, supra note 244. 
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Should such a provision be deemed a necessity, it is possible that 
Congress, not CEQ, could promulgate such an exception. Congress 
could define more certainly what conditions would constitute such 
an emergency, and set up procedures, much like an expedited EIS 
process, that would involve the public, and other federal agencies in 
the process. These procedures would build an adequate record for 
meaningful judicial review and curtail abuse of discretion, all within 
an abbreviated time span. Such a procedure would provide an ade-
quate, rapid procedure for dealing with an emergency without losing 
sight of the environmental goals embodied in NEP A and strictly 
adhered to by the courts. 
